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Abstract. The present paper combines loss attitudes and linear utility by providing an ax-
iomaticanalysis of corresponding preferencesin a cumulative prospect theory (CPT) framework.
(CPT) is one of the most promising alternatives to expected utility theory since it incorporates
loss aversion, and linear utility for money receives increasing attention since it is often concluded
in empirical research, and employed in theoretical applications. Rabin (2000) emphasizes the
importance of linear utility, and highlights loss aversion as an explanatory feature for the dis-
parity of signiﬁcant small-scale risk aversion and reasonable large-scale risk aversion. In a sense
we derive a two-sided variant of Yaari’s dual theory, i.e. nonlinear probability weights in the
presence of linear utility. The ﬁrst important diﬀerence is that utility may have a kink at the
status quo, which allows for the exhibition of loss aversion. Also, we may have diﬀerent proba-
bility weighting functions for gains than for losses. The central condition of our model is termed
independence of common increments. The applications of our model to portfolio selection and
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21 Introduction
Empirical research has shown that expected utility (EU) fails to provide a good description
of individual behavior under risk. Examples are the famous paradoxes of Allais (1953)
and Ellsberg (1961). This evidence has motivated the development of alternative theories
(the so-called non-expected utility theories), which allow for the exhibition of “paradoxical
behavior.” Building upon its predecessor prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979),
cumulative prospect theory (CPT) has nowadays become the most prominent of these
alternatives.
Recently, a new criticism of EU has been put forward by Rabin (2000) and Rabin
and Thaler (2001). Following earlier work by Hansson (1988), these authors show that
reasonable degrees of risk aversion over small and modest stakes imply unreasonable high
degrees of risk aversion over large stakes in the EU framework. For instance an EU-
maximizer who initially rejects a 50-50 bet of loosing $10 and winning $11 regardless of
the current wealth would also reject any 50-50 bet of losing $100 and winning $x for any
large value of x. Since this high degree of risk aversion seems to be irrational, Rabin (2000)
concluded that EU is only a good representation of risk neutral behavior, which necessarily
means that utility has to be linear. Neilson (2001) has shown that this criticism on EU
carries over to rank-dependent utility which is further prominent alternative to EU and
a precursor of CPT. More precisely, in the rank-dependent utility framework the utility
function should also be linear because concave utility implies, as for EU, unreasonable
high degrees of risk aversion over large stakes.
Considering the importance of linear utility, the goal of the present paper is to investi-
gate linear utility for decision under risk in a CPT framework by providing an axiomatic
3analysis of corresponding preferences. Rabin (2000) points out that a model incorporating
loss attitudes reconciles signiﬁcant degrees of risk aversion for small-scale outcomes and
reasonable degrees of risk aversion for large-scale outcomes. CPT, as a direct generaliza-
tion of expected utility and of rank dependent utility, takes into account attitudes towards
losses. The characteristic features of CPT are rank-dependence, reference-dependence,
and sign-dependence. Rank-dependence resolves the paradoxes of Allais (1953) and Ells-
berg (1961), and has played an important role in the axiomatizations of rank-dependent
expected utility (Quiggin 1981, Wakker 1989, Schmeidler 1989). By transforming cumula-
tive instead of single probabilities rank-dependence enables the incorporation of nonlinear
perception of probabilities into decision under risk, without implying violations of stochas-
tic dominance as in the original prospect theory model.
Experimental ﬁndings suggest that decision makers perceive outcomes as diﬀerences to
their status quo rather than absolute wealth levels (Markovitz 1952, Edwards 1954, Yaari
1965, Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Tversky and Kahneman 1991, Harless and Camerer
1994). Reference-dependence means that losses (i.e., negative deviations from the status
quo) are perceived diﬀerently than gains. A loss seems to have a greater impact than
the corresponding gain, which has motivated Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to propose
the hypothesis of loss aversion (the aversion of a loss weights signiﬁcantly more than
the attraction by a corresponding gain). Loss aversion has been proved to be fruitful in
explaining paradoxical phenomena as the equity premium puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler
1995, Gneezy and Potters 1997), the overtime premium puzzle (Dunn 1996), the status
quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988), and the endowment eﬀect (Thaler 1980). The
latter explains the observed disparity between the willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-
accept (Kachelmeier and Shehata 1992). The status quo is usually assumed to be the
4current wealth position, however, it may be inﬂuenced by other factors. For example,
based on empirical evidence by Green (1963), Swalm (1966), and Halter and Dean (1971),
the status quo was assumed to be a target return in the models of Fishburn (1977) and
Holthausen (1981).
There is also empirical evidence which suggests that the nonlinear perception of prob-
abilities, as explained above, is inﬂuenced by whether gains or losses are considered (Ed-
wards 1955, Slovic and Lichtenstein 1968, Einhorn and Hogarth 1986, Currim and Sarin
1989, Tversky and Kahneman 1992). This feature, referred to as sign-dependence, leads
to diﬀerent decision weights for gains than for losses.
Because CPT combines these three desirable features, it is currently the most used
model for decision under risk in empirical research. It was ﬁrst proposed by Starmer and
Sugden (1989). Later, axiomatizations of CPT have been provided by Luce and Fishburn
(1991), Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Wakker and Tversky (1993), Chateauneuf and
Wakker (1999), and Schmidt (2000). This paper provides a new axiomatization of CPT
with a piecewise linear utility function. More precisely, utility is linear for gains and
linear for losses with a possible kink at the status quo. If loss aversion is satisﬁed, utility
is steeper in the domain of gains than in the domain of losses.
Linear utility has a long tradition in theoretical and empirical research. An axiomatic
foundation of subjective expected utility with linear utility was provided by de Finetti
(1931). Preston and Baratta (1948) used a linear utility model in order to estimate prob-
ability distortions. Edwards (1955) reports about a series of experiments which support
our model. He ﬁnds evidence for sign-dependent probability distortions and also for lin-
ear utility. Many studies observed linear utility for losses (Hershey and Schoemaker 1980,
Schneider and Lopes 1986, Cohen, Jaﬀray, and Said 1987, Weber and Bottom 1989, Lopes
5and Oden 1999). Moreover, for small stakes it seems to be commonly agreed that utility
is linear (Lopes 1995, Fox, Rogers, and Tversky 1996, Kilka and Weber 1998).
Handa (1977) axiomatized a model of subjective expected value, which was implic-
itly used by Preston and Baratta (1948) and already discussed in Edwards (1955). In
that model the value of a lottery is given by the sum of distorted probabilities multiplied
with their corresponding outcomes. As in the original prospect theory, not cumulative
but single probabilities are distorted and, therefore, violations of stochastic dominance
are implied. This was ﬁrst pointed out by Fishburn (1978). One model that combines
linear utility and distorted probabilities without violating stochastic dominance is the
dual theory (DT) of Yaari (1987). Similarly to our model, cumulative probabilities are
distorted, however, the resulting probability weights are not sign-dependent. Moreover,
reference-dependence and, therefore, also loss aversion are not permitted under DT. A
second axiomatization of DT was oﬀered by Safra and Segal (1998). As Yaari (1987)
they exclude sign- and reference-dependence by considering only positive consequences.
Their essential assumptions are constant proportional and constant absolute risk aversion
jointly uniﬁed under the name constant risk aversion. Moreover, they use additional pref-
erence conditions which impose strong restrictions on the range of probability weighting
functions.
We are convinced that CPT with linear utility is not only useful as a descriptive model
in empirical research but may also generate new insights in theoretical applications. In
particular, due to the additional freedom gained by reference- and sign-dependence, the
model is a good alternative to the DT which has often been applied in economic analyses.
Some examples are ﬁrm behavior under risk (Demers and Demers 1990), insurance de-
6mand (Doherty and Eeckhoudt 1995, Schmidt 1996), insurance pricing (Wang 1995, 1996,
Wang, Young and Panjer 1997), agency theory (Schmidt 1999a), and eﬃcient risk-sharing
(Schmidt 1999b). Interestingly, van der Hoek and Sherris (2001) propose a risk measure
for portfolio choice and insurance decisions based on DT and choose diﬀerent weighting
functions for gains and losses. Therefore, our model can serve as a theoretical basis for
their risk measure.
Altogether, linear utility plays an important role in both theoretical and empirical
research, especially for analyzing ﬁrm behavior and insurance economics. This conclusion
is reinforced by the results of Rabin (2000) and Rabin and Thaler (2001) since they clearly
show that the common assumption of concave utility has undesirable and unrealistic
implications. The goal of the present paper is to provide a theoretical foundation of linear
utility, which is in accordance with recent empirical ﬁndings and which is well-suited for
theoretical and empirical applications.
In the next section we will present the model and introduce our central condition,
termed independence of common increments. In contrast to other conditions which have
been employed to derive CPT, the condition of independence of common increments is
rather simple and, therefore, well suited for empirical research. More precisely, with the
help of independence of common increments one can empirically test the linearity of utility
even if eﬀects of rank-, reference-, and sign-dependence are involved.
In Section 3 we apply our model to portfolio selection and insurance demand. The
various applications of DT mentioned above have shown that the linearity of utility often
implies a pattern of behavior which has been termed “plunging” by Yaari (1987). For
example when choosing between a safe and a risky asset a decision maker in DT never
diversiﬁes but invests either all money in the safe asset or everything in the risky asset.
7Analogously, DT predicts for insurance demand that individuals either buy full coverage
or no coverage while partial coverage is never optimal. Our results show that behavior
under CPT with linear utility is more realistic since only a weakened variant of plunging
is implied: In the portfolio selection problem an individual may also diversify, however
if she diversiﬁes, she always sticks to one speciﬁc portfolio composition. Analogously, an
individual may demand partial coverage in insurance problems, however, if she demands
partial coverage, she will always demand the same amount of coverage.
2 The Model
We consider a set of monetary outcomes identiﬁed with IR.Alottery is a ﬁnite probability
distribution over the set of outcomes. It is represented by P := (p1,x 1;...;pn,x n) meaning
that probability pj is assigned to outcome xj, for j =1 ,...,n. With this notation we
implicitly assume that outcomes are ranked in decreasing order, i.e., x1 > ···> xn. The
probabilities pj are nonnegative and sum to one. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the status quo is given by zero. Therefore, we refer to positive outcomes as gains
and to negative outcomes as losses.
We assume a preference relation < over the set of lotteries, where Â denotes strict
preference and ∼ denotes indiﬀerence. Our goal is to ﬁnd a functional that represents
preferences over lotteries. This necessarily implies that < must be a weak order, i.e. < is
complete (P < Q or P 4 Q for all lotteries P,Q) and transitive. Moreover, we assume that
< satisﬁes simple continuity, i.e. for any lottery (p1,x 1;...;pn,x n), the sets {(y1,...,y n):
(p1,y 1;...;pn,y n) < (p1,x 1;...;pn,x n)} and {(y1,...,y n):( p1,y 1;...;pn,y n) 4 (p1,x 1;...;pn,x n)}
are closed subsets of IR n.
8From Debreu (1954) we know that weak ordering and simple continuity guarantee the
existence of a functional V that represents preference, i.e. P < Q ⇔ V (P) > V (Q) for
all lotteries P and Q.
A particular functional form of V is CPT. As argued above our goal is to derive a
model of CPT with linear utility which we will refer to as linear cumulative prospect
theory (LCPT). Consider a lottery P =( p1,x 1;...;pn,x n) such that
x1 > ···> xk > 0 >x k+1 > ···> xn,










x, for all x > 0,
λx, with λ > 0 for all x 6 0
and the decision weights πi,i=1 ,...,n,are deﬁned as follows. There exist two probability
weighting functions w+,w − :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] with w+(0) = w−(0) = 0 and w+(1) = w−(1) =





w+(p1 + ···+ pi) − w+(p1 + ···+ pi−1), if i 6 k,
w−(pi + ···+ pn) − w−(pi+1 + ···+ pn), if i>k .
for each i ∈ {1,...,n}. Therefore, for gains (i 6 k) the decision weight πi represents a
diﬀerence in transformed decumulative probabilities, whereas for losses (i>k ) cumulative
probabilities are transformed. The fact that w+(p)m a yd i ﬀer from 1−w−(1−p), the dual
of w−,r e ﬂects sign-dependence. The parameter λ in the utility function is the loss aversion
parameter. Loss aversion is characterized by λ > 1. Note that without sign-dependence
LCPT would reduce to the dual theory of Yaari (1987) if λ =1 .
In general both weighting functions are assumed to be strictly increasing. This is
necessary in order to guarantee consistency with stochastic dominance. The preference
9relation < satisﬁes stochastic dominance if (p1,x 1;...;pn,x n) Â (p1,y 1;...;pn,y n) when-
ever xj > yj for all j and xj >y j for at least one j with pj > 0. Since the probabilities
are ﬁxed this condition comes down to monotonicity in outcomes.
So far we have considered only standard conditions (weak order, simple continuity,
and stochastic dominance) which imply only the existence of a representing functional
that is consistent with stochastic dominance. In order to derive a CPT functional further
conditions have to be imposed. Because such conditions need to imply the separation of
utility and decision weights and above that to imply sign-dependence, most conditions
that are employed in the derivation of general CPT are rather complex. For example Luce
and Fishburn (1991) use a condition called compound gamble and joint receipt, whereas
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Wakker and Tversky (1993), Chateauneuf and Wakker
(1999), and Schmidt (2000) use sign-dependent and comonotonic tradeoﬀ consistency. In
contrast, Wakker and Zank (2001) use a generalization of traditional constant proportional
risk aversion to nonpositive outcomes to derive a CPT model where utility is a power
function. The latter result shows that if one is interested in a particular form for utility,
much simpler axioms may be employed in order to characterize CPT.
In this paper we are also interested in a particular form for utility. Hence, we propose
an alternative condition, termed independence of common increments, which is rather
simple in its formulation but strong in its implications as it leads to the derivation of a
piecewise linear utility function. In order to formulate the condition as weak and simple
as possible, we consider only lotteries with equally likely outcomes. Formulations of
preference conditions for equally likely outcomes have already been proposed by Ramsey
(1931), Debreu (1959), Blackorby, Davidson, and Donaldson (1977), Chew and Epstein
(1989), and Schmidt and Zank (2001a). An analysis of the implications of equally likely
10outcomes for dominance and independence rules is oﬀered in Quiggin (1989).
The advantage of considering only equally likely outcomes is that people may perceive
them easier. This is because in comparisons between such lotteries probabilities can be
suppressed, thereby reducing the cognitive eﬀort for the evaluation of the lotteries. Since
probabilities and outcomes are measured on diﬀerent scales, a tradeoﬀ between them is
rather diﬃcult. As a result people may overweight probabilities in choice problems, but
overweight outcomes in pricing problems. This pattern of behavior has been referred
to as scale compatibility in the psychological literature (Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic
1988, Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman 1990). Scale compatibility is nowadays the most
prominent explanation of the preference reversal phenomenon ﬁrst observed by Slovic
and Lichtenstein (1968). Considering only equally likely outcomes should reduce such
inconsistencies and is, therefore, particularly suited for empirical research.
To simplify notation, we identify a lottery ( 1
n,x 1;...; 1
n,x n) with the vector (x1,...,x n)
where (x1 >x 2 > ···>x n). Independence of common increments is deﬁned as follows.
For two lotteries (x1,...,x n) and (y1,...,y n) and α ∈ IR we have
(x1,...,x i,...,x n) < (y1,...,y i,...,y n) ⇒
(x1,...,x i + α,...,x n) < (y1,...,y i + α,...,y n),
whenever xi,x i+α,y i,y i+α are of the same sign, that is either they are all gains or they
are all losses. Implicitly in the above deﬁnition the ranking of outcomes should remain the
same. Therefore, an additional constraint is imposed on the magnitude of the constant
α.
Independence of common increments says that a common absolute change of an out-
come of the same rank does not revert the preference between two lotteries as long as
this change is small enough to aﬀect neither the rank nor the sign of outcomes. For
11α small enough, repeated application of this principle yields (x1 + α,...,x n + α) <
(y1 + α,...,y n + α), indicating that it implies a weakened variant of the concept of con-
stant absolute risk aversion (CARA). The restrictions on α mentioned above are crucial
for the diﬀerence to traditional CARA.
Because in the deﬁnition of our independence condition the outcomes in the considered
lotteries are all diﬀerent there exist constants α1 > ···> αn such that
(x1,...,x i,...,x n) < (y1,...,y i,...,y n) ⇒
(x1 + α1,...,x n + αn) < (y1 + α1,...,y n + αn)
if xk,y k > 0 >x k+1,y k+1. This shows that the property comes close to additivity on rank
ordered sets. Such a condition has been used by Weymark (1981) to derive the generalized
Gini welfare functions. Our condition here is weaker because of its reference- and sign-
dependent nature. If we would drop the sign- and the rank-dependence restrictions we
would get additivity on general sets. That and stochastic dominance are equivalent to the
non-existence of a Dutch book, and the latter condition has been used by de Finetti (1931)
to derive subjective expected utility with linear utility. This demonstrates that the only
features that we have added to additivity are rank-dependence, reference-dependence, and
sign-dependence, the basic characteristics of CPT.
It is easy to show that independence of common increments is a necessary condition
for CPT with linear utility. The next theorem shows that the property is also suﬃcient
in the presence of weak ordering, simple continuity and stochastic dominance.
Theorem 1 Assume a preference relation < on the set of lotteries. The following con-
ditions are equivalent:
(i) < satisﬁes weak ordering, simple continuity, stochastic dominance, and indepen-
dence of common increments.
12(ii) LCPT holds with strictly increasing weighting functions.
If one of the above statements holds, then the weighting functions are uniquely deter-
mined and the utility function is a ratio scale, i.e. it is unique up to multiplication by a
positive constant. ¤
This theorem — proved in the appendix — demonstrates that due to its simple formu-
lation independence of common increments is a suitable concept for empirical research in
the examination of linear utility in the presence of rank-, reference-, and sign-dependence.
3 Applications
3.1 Portfolio Selection
In the introduction we mentioned that DT implies behavior which can be characterized as
all-or-nothing decision. The reason for this plunging behavior is the fact that the linearity
of utility in DT produces corner solutions (Yaari 1987). The goal of the present section
is to investigate whether plunging is also implied by LCPT. Therefore, we consider a
simple problem of portfolio selection which can be analyzed graphically in a two-outcome
diagram. In such a diagram it is assumed that there are only two possible states of the
world, state A and state B. The consequences associated with these states are denoted
by xA and xB, respectively. Moreover, it is assumed that the states occur with ﬁxed
probabilities, that is we can assume that 0 <p<1 is the probability of state A and
1 − p the probability of state B. In order to compare LCPT with DT we will ﬁrst
analyze DT as reference model. As mentioned above LCPT reduces to DT if reference-
and sign-dependence can be ignored, i.e. the loss aversion factor λ is always equal to
unity and the weighting functions for gains coincides with the dual one for losses (i.e.






w(p)xA +( 1− w(p))xB if xA > xB
w(1 − p)xB +( 1− w(1 − p))xA if xB >x A.










w(p) if xA >x B
−
w(1−p)
1−w(1−p) if xB >x A.
This equation shows that indiﬀerence curves are negatively sloped and piecewise linear.
Note that strong risk aversion in DT implies that the weighting function is strictly convex
(Chew, Karni, and Safra 1987, Yaari 1987), i.e. w(p)+w(1 − p) < 1, which yields
1−w(p) >w (1−p) and w(p) < 1−w(1−p). Hence, the indiﬀerence curves for xA >x B
are steeper than those for xA <x B, meaning that they have a kink along the 450-line
as depicted in Figure 1. Moreover, the slope of the indiﬀerence curves is independent of





Let us now consider LCPT. For convenience, we exchange the function w− for its dual
˜ w− deﬁned by ˜ w−(q): =1− w−(1 − q) for q ∈ [0,1], that is, we consider transformed
decumulative probabilities not only for gains but also for losses. Then, the utility of a
two-outcome lottery is given by
LCPT(P)=

            
            
w+(p)xA +( 1− w+(p))xB if xA > xB > 0
w+(1 − p)xB +( 1− w+(1 − p))xA if xB >x A > 0
˜ w−(p)λxA +( 1− ˜ w−(p))λxB if 0 > xA > xB
˜ w−(1 − p)λxB +( 1− ˜ w−(1 − p))λxA if 0 > xB >x A
w+(p)xA +( 1− ˜ w−(p))λxB if xA > 0 >x B
w+(1 − p)xB +( 1− ˜ w−(1 − p)λxA if xB > 0 >x A,






            
            
−
1−w+(p)
w+(p) if xA >x B > 0
−
w+(1−p)
1−w+(1−p) if xB >x A > 0
−
1− ˜ w−(p)
˜ w−(p) if 0 > xA >x B
−
˜ w−(1−p)
1− ˜ w−(1−p) if 0 > xB >x A
−
λ(1− ˜ w−(p))
w+(p) if xA > 0 >x B
−
w+(1−p)
λ(1− ˜ w−(1−p)) if xB > 0 >x A.
In the following we assume that w+ and ˜ w− are strictly convex and that for all q ∈ [0,1]
we have λ >
w+(q)
˜ w−(q) as well as λ >
1−w+(q)
1− ˜ w−(q). If we consider only two-outcome lotteries, these
assumptions are necessary and suﬃcient for the exhibition of strong risk aversion (Schmidt




Figure 2: Indifference curves in LCPT
In this ﬁgure, three types of indiﬀerence curves are considered, curve a representing
a strictly positive utility level, curve b representing a utility level of zero, and curve c
16representing a strictly negative utility level. The shape of curve a becomes clear by ob-












λ(1− ˜ w−(1−p)) while the






1− ˜ w−(1−p) >
w+(1−p)
λ(1− ˜ w−(1−p)). Compared
to DT, indiﬀerence curves have additional kinks at both axes. Moreover, due to sign-
dependence, indiﬀerence curves representing a positive utility level may have a diﬀerent
slope than those representing a negative utility level.
We will now investigate a simple portfolio selection problem already studied, among
others, by Tobin (1958), Arrow (1965), and Cass and Stiglitz (1972) which has been
applied to DT by Yaari (1987). Consider an individual who may invest a ﬁxed positive
amount ¯ y into two assets, one riskless asset with a ﬁxed positive interest rate r>0 and
one risky asset. Suppose that the risky asset has a high return zA >rin state A and a
negative return zB < 0 in state B. It is well known that a risk averse expected utility
maximizer would always invest some amount yEU with 0 <y EU < ¯ y into the risky asset
provided that the expected return, i.e. pzA +(1−p)zB, is strictly greater than r. On the
other hand, DT implies an investment of yDT in the risky asset given by
yDT =

   
















This behavior has been termed as plunging: The investor either invests everything
safe or everything risky depending on the relative rate of return of the risky asset.
Let us now consider LCPT. This requires a choice of the status quo. Already Kahne-
man and Tversky (1979) argued that the status quo is in most cases given by the initial
position. Since also most applications choose initial wealth as status quo we think it is
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The validity of this equation can be easily checked by considering Figure 3. In case I the





which yields yLCPT = 0 as optimum. In case II the budget line is steeper than the
indiﬀerence curve for xA >x B > 0 but ﬂatter than the indiﬀerence curve for xA > 0 >x B
which implies that xB = 0 and, therefore, yLCPT =
r¯ y
r−zB is optimal. Finally, if the budget










Figure 3: Portfolio selection in LCPT
18Altogether the result shows that individuals in LCPT exhibit only a weak variant of
plunging. In contrast to DT there is not only an all-or-nothing decision but there exist
also relative returns of the risky asset for which diversiﬁcation is optimal. However, if the
individual diversiﬁes, she or he always invests that amount in the risky asset for which
the ﬁnal wealth in the unfavorable state equals the status quo.
Note that the possibility of diversiﬁcation in LCPT is an immediate consequence of
reference dependence which implies the additional kink of indiﬀerence curves along both
axes. Sign-dependence, on the other hand, allows for diﬀerent investment behavior in the
gain and in the loss domain. Note that in DT the optimal investment does only depend
on
zA−r
zB−r. In contrast, the optimal investment in LCPT for positive r can diﬀer from the
optimal investment for negative r (which ´may for instance be a result of holding money




In this section we will analyze demand for coinsurance with LCPT. Again we will only
consider two possible states of the world in order to allow for a graphical analysis in the
two-outcome diagram. Suppose the initial wealth of an individual is given by ¯ xA in state
A and by ¯ xB =¯ xA − L<¯ xA in state be where L is some monetary loss which can be
insured. More precisely, if the individual enters into an insurance contract, he or she has
to pay a premium R with
R = γC
and, therefore, receives a compensation C,06 C 6 L, if state B occurs. An insurance
premium is said to be fair if γ = p. With the possibility of insurance the ﬁnal wealth
distribution is given by
19xA =¯ xA − γC
xB =¯ xB − γC + C =¯ xB +( 1− γ)C,
which implies that the slope of the budget line is given by −
γ
1−γ.
The problem of the optimal choice of C has been studied in the DT framework by
Doherty and Eeckhoudt (1995) and Schmidt (1996). They have shown that the demand
for coinsurance CDT is in DT given by
CDT =

   
















This equation shows that individuals in DT also exhibit plunging for insurance demand
since they either demand no coverage of full coverage while partial coverage is only optimal





If we want analyze insurance demand with LCPT, again the reference point has to
be ﬁxed. There is not much literature on the choice of the reference point in the case of
a random initial wealth. We think that it is most convincing to assume that the status
quo q is somewhere in-between the two possible initial wealth levels, i.e. xA >q>x B.
We further assume that q<¯ xA − γL, i.e. both outcomes are gains in the case of full
insurance. Note that for q =¯ xA−γL optimal insurance demand for DT and LCPT would
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20The validity of this equation can be easily inferred from Figure 4. In order to ﬁnd
the optimal solution the slope of the budget line has to be compared with the slope
of indiﬀerence curves. Apart from the slope of the budget line, −
γ
1−γ, the problem is
identical to the portfolio selection problem presented in the preceding section. Therefore,









Figure 4: Insurance demand in LCPT
Also for insurance demand under LCPT individuals exhibit only a weak variant of
plunging. In contrast to DT they choose not only between no and full coverage but there
exist also values of γ for which partial coverage is optimal. However, if an individual
demands partial coverage she or he always chooses that value of C for which ﬁnal wealth
in the worse state equals the status quo.
4 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: First we assume statement (ii) and derive statement (i). Let
21LCPT hold for a preference relation < on the set of lotteries. Then, weak ordering follows
from the fact that LCPT represents the preference on the set of lotteries. Because util-
ity is continuous under LCPT, simple continuity is satisﬁed. Moreover, utility is strictly
increasing as well as the weighting functions, which implies stochastic dominance. It
remains to show that independence of common increments is satisﬁed. Consider two lot-
teries (x1,...,x n) and (y1,...,y n) such that (x1,...,x n) < (y1,...,y n). Let i ∈ {1,...,n}
be arbitrary. Then
(x1,...,x i,...,x n) < (y1,...,y i,...,y n)
⇔
LCPT(x1,...,x i,...,x n) > LCPT(y1,...,y i,...,y n)
We consider the case that xi and yi are gains. After substitution of LCPT we get
i−1 X
j=1
















Take any α ∈ IR such that xi,x i + α,y i,y i + α are positive and such that both xi−1 >



















Note that the choice of α is crucial. That the sign of the aﬀected outcomes is the same
ensures that the decision weights are generated by the same weighting function. Moreover,
because the ranking of outcomes has not been altered the decision weights for the involved
outcomes is the same. That is, the above equation can be written as
LCPT(x1,...,x i−1,x i + α,x i+1,...,x n) > LCPT(y1,...,y i−1,y i + α,y i+1,...,y n)
or equivalently
(x1,...,x i−1,x i + α,x i+1,...,x n) < (y1,...,y i−1,y i + α,y i+1,...,y n).
The case where both xi, and yi are losses is similar. Hence, we have shown that indepen-
dence of common increments is satisﬁed, which concludes the derivation of statement (i)
from statement (ii).
22Now we assume statement (i) and derive statement (ii). Let us brieﬂy outline the main
steps of the proof. First, we show that independence of common increments is satisﬁed
on the set of lotteries with equally likely outcomes which may be equal. Then, for a ﬁxed
natural number n, we show that LCPT holds on the set of lotteries with n equally likely
(and possible equal) outcomes. In a subsequent step we show that LCPT holds on the set
of lotteries with rational probabilities. Then, LCPT can uniquely be extended to hold on
the entire set of lotteries, which concludes the derivation of statement (ii). Finally, the
uniqueness results in the theorem are derived.
For any natural number n let L(n) denote the set of lotteries where outcomes are















,x n)|x1 > ···> xn}
as the set of lotteries where outcomeshaving probabilities 1/n are not necessarilydistinct.
Independence of common increments is deﬁned to hold only for lotteries from L(n).
However, in the presence of the remaining conditions, independence of common increments
holds on ¯ L(n) as well, as the next lemma shows.
Lemma 2 Suppose that < satisﬁes weak ordering, simple continuity, stochastic dom-
inance, and independence of common increments. Then < satisﬁes independence of
common increments on ¯ L(n) for any natural number n.
Proof: Suppose that independence of common increments is not satisﬁed on ¯ L(n)
for some n. Obviously, n>1 by stochastic dominance and completeness. Then, there
exists a pair of lotteries (x1,...,x n),(y1,...,y n) ∈ ¯ L(n) such that for some i ∈ {1,...,n}
and some α ∈ IR we have a preference reversal
(x1,...,x i,...,x n) < (y1,...,y i,...,y n)
23⇒
(x1,...,x i + α,...,x n) ≺ (y1,...,y i + α,...,y n)
although xi,x i + α,y i,y i + α are of the same sign and xi−1 >x i + α >x i+1 and yi−1 >
yi + α >y i+1 holds.
We write x+1 i ·α instead of (x1,...,x i +α,...,x n). By continuity there exists δ < 0
such that
x +1 i · α ≺ y +1 i · α +1 n · δ.
By stochastic dominance we have
x Â y +1 n · δ.
We show that the last two preferences cannot occur jointly. Let j be the smallest index
such that xj = xj+1. Then for εj > 0 small enough continuity implies
x +1 i · α +1 j · εj ≺ y +1 i · α +1 n · δ.
Also, stochastic dominance implies
x +1 j · εj Â y +1 n · δ.
By repeating this process for all such indices j for which xj = xj+1 we can distort the
lottery x into a lottery ˜ x with strictly rank-ordered outcomes such that
˜ x +1 i · α ≺ y +1 i · α +1 n · δ
and
˜ x Â y +1 n · δ.
Note that in y +1 n ·δ outcomes may not be strictly rank-ordered. However, applying the
same procedure as above to y +1 n · δ we can distort this lottery into one called ˜ y where
outcomes are strictly rank-ordered. We get
˜ x +1 i · α ≺ ˜ y +1 i · α
and
˜ x Â ˜ y.
24This clearly contradicts independence of common increments. This concludes the proof
of the lemma. 4
Let n be an arbitrary natural number. We derive LCPT on ¯ L(n,k): ={x ∈ ¯ L(n)|xk >
0 > xk+1}. First, note that weak ordering, stochastic dominance, continuity and indepen-
dence of common increments are satisﬁed on this set of lotteries. Next, we show that on
¯ L(n,k) the preference relation satisﬁes comonotonic independence. Comonotonic inde-
pendence says that replacing common outcomes by possibly diﬀerent common outcomes
does not aﬀect the preference between two lotteries, i.e.,
x +1 i · (α − xi) < y +1 i · (α − yi)
implies
x +1 i · (β − xi) < y +1 i · (β − yi).
Comonotonic independence follows immediate from independence of common increments
and the previous lemma.
Hence, < on ¯ L(n,k) satisﬁes weak ordering, stochastic dominance, simple continuity,
and comonotonic independence. Comonotonic independence is stronger than the separa-
bility conditions proposed by Gorman (1968), which imply additive representability. This
result has been used in Theorem C.6 of Chateauneuf and Wakker (1993). Accordingly, we
conclude that there exists an additive representation V n,k(x)=
Pn
j=1 V k
j for < on ¯ L(n,k).
Moreover, on ¯ L(n,k) independence of common increments is satisﬁed, so that for α ∈ IR
x ∼ y ⇒ x +1 i · α ∼ y +1 i · α,
whenever xi,x i + α,y i,y i + α are of the same sign. Substitution of V n,k(x) gives
V
k




i (xi + α) − V
k
i (yi + α),
which implies linearity of V k
i on IR + if i 6 k and on IR − if i > k +1 .
Let now k 6 n − 1 be arbitrary ﬁxed. Then, on the set ¯ L(n,k) ∩ ¯ L(n,k +1 )={x ∈




i ’s are cardinal, we can choose V k
i = V
k+1
i for i 6= k + 1 on the common domain. In










i = Vi on IR − if i>k+1 ,
hence, these functions are independent of k. Moreover, for i = k + 1 the domain of V k
k+1
is IR − and the domain of V
k+1







k+1 , on IR +,
V k
k+1, on IR −,
the functions Vi for i =1 ,...,nare extended to all of IR.
Let us summarize. We have derived an additive representation V n(x)=
Pn
j=1 Vj for
< on ¯ L(n), with cardinal functions Vi which are linear on IR + and linear on IR −.W e
can, therefore, ﬁx the functions Vi(0) = 0 for all i and set V (1,...,1) = 1. Because of
linearity of these functions on IR + we know that they are proportional to each other and
in particular to their sum. Therefore we can derive decision weights π
+
i (= Vi(1)) that




The decision weights π
+
i are diﬀerences in transformed decumulative probabilities: We








0, if j =0 ,
π
+
1 + ···+ π
+
j , if j =1 ,...,n.
This way w+
n is uniquely deﬁned, it is monotonic on its domain and satisﬁes w+
n(0) = 0
and w+





Similarly, there exist decision weights π
−
i (= Vi(−1)/V (−1,...,−1)) that are positive




The constant λ is positive and is deﬁned as −V (−1,...,−1). Moreover, λ is independent
of i due to the cardinality of the functions Vi. The decision weights π
−








0, if j =0 ,
π
−
1 + ···+ π
−
j , if j =1 ,...,n.
Also, w−
n is uniquely deﬁned, it is monotonic on its domain and satisﬁes w−
n(0) = 0 and
w−
n(1) = 1.
Therefore, we have derived LCPT on ¯ L(n) for a ﬁxed natural number n.
Next, take n and m to be two distinct natural numbers. Then, on ¯ L(n) LCPT holds as
well as on ¯ L(m), and on ¯ L(nm). Because ¯ L(n), and ¯ L(m) are subsets of ¯ L(nm) it follows
that λ is independent of n (m,nm), and that the involved weighting functions agree on
common domain. Thus, they are also independent of n (m,nm), and moreover, they are
deﬁned on the rational probabilities inheriting all properties. We have therefore derived
LCPT on the entire set of lotteries with rational probabilities.
Let now p := (p1,...,p n) be any probability vector. We consider the set Lp of lotteries
with ﬁxed probability vector p.O nLp the preference relation < satisﬁes weak ordering
stochastic dominance and simple continuity, and can be represented by a function Wp :
Lp → IR that is unique up to strictly increasing continuous transformations.
Also, each lottery (p1,x 1;...;pn,x n) ∈ Lp has a uniquely determined certainty equiv-
alent (1,CE(p1,x 1;...;pn,x n)), i.e. the lottery that is indiﬀerent to (p1,x 1;...;pn,x n)
and has sure outcome CE(p1,x 1;...;pn,x n). The existence follows by continuity and
uniqueness by stochastic dominance.
Therefore, we can choose Wp to agree with the LCPT functional above on the set of
certain lotteries, implying Wp(1,α)=LCPT(1,α) for all α ∈ IR. Because for each lottery
(p1,x 1;...;pn,x n) ∈ Lp we have Wp(p1,x 1;...;pn,x n)=Wp(1,CE(p1,x 1;...;pn,x n)) =
27LCPT(1,CE(p1,x 1;...;pn,x n)), we have found a functional, say V , that represents pref-
erence on the union of both sets of lotteries, namely on Lp and on the set of lotteries
with rational probabilities. This functional V agrees with Wp on Lp and with the above
LCPT-functional on the set of lotteries with rational probabilities.
Because the probability tuple p was arbitrary chosen, we conclude the existence of a
general functional representing preference on the entire set of lotteries and which agrees
with LCPT on the set of lotteries with rational probabilities. Again we call this functional
V .
Note that the set of lotteries with all probabilities rational is a dense subset of the entire
set of lotteries, and the latter can be viewed as a linear space. Also, V is a continuous
functional that is linear on the dense subspace of lotteries with all probabilities rational.
Therefore, V has a unique linear extension to the entire set of lotteries (Dunford and
Schwartz, 1958). Hence, we conclude that LCPT holds on the entire set of lotteries.
Finally, let us recall that under general cumulative prospect theory the weighting
functions are unique and utility is a ratio scale. Here we have derived CPT with a speciﬁc
utility function. Utility is linear for gains and it is linear for losses. Hence, the uniqueness
results apply here. This completes the proof of Theorem 1. ¤
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